The End of America’s Well-Intentioned Empire | Opinion

The world was hugely interested in the U.S. presidential election—and everywhere people are wondering what the return of Donald Trump will mean in geopolitics. But is America interested in the world? Increasingly, and certainly judging by the inwardly focused campaign, not so much.
Which is a serious departure from the post-World War II consensus.
American voters were rarely much animated by foreign policy, but the political establishment certainly was. And if you hear speeches by presidents from Harry Truman and Dwight Eisenhower to George W. Bush and Barack Obama you will observe a striking bipartisan consensus about using American might to further democracy, freedom, and liberal values.
“Throughout America’s adventure in free government, our basic purposes have been to keep the peace, to foster progress in human achievement, and to enhance liberty, dignity, and integrity among peoples and among nations,” said the Republican Eisenhower, in his 1961 farewell address. “We dream of a world where all are fed and charged with hope, and we will help to make it so,” said the Democrat Lyndon Johnson, in 1967.
And here’s Richard Nixon, a Republican who they’re still kicking around, in his silent majority” speech in 1969: “Let historians not record that when America was the most powerful nation in the world, we passed on the other side of the road and allowed the last hopes for peace and freedom of millions of people to be suffocated by the forces of totalitarianism.”
They all believed in a U.S.-led world order focused on preventing conflicts and fostering economic stability through multilateral cooperation and the principles of democracy, collective security, and free trade.
Truman laid the foundations with the establishment of NATO in 1949. The creation of the United Nations and institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank was part of this effort, as was the Marshall Plan that helped to rebuild Europe in hopes of preventing the spread of communism through economic recovery and political stability. Eisenhower expanded on Truman’s vision, emphasizing the importance of peace, progress, and human dignity, overseeing the solidification of NATO.
Kennedy established the Peace Corps and the Alliance for Progress in Latin America, both aligned with the same thing. Johnson’s foreign policy argued that the civil rights movement at home gave the U.S. a greater moral authority abroad, allowing it to project democratic values with credibility.
It is especially interesting to note that the lack of major differences between the parties applied also to the Vietnam War, which was spectacularly divisive in America. But the divisions were along lines of class and generations—but not between the parties. Both Johnson and his Nixon felt a commitment to fight communism—but also wanted to end the war in some way that was not devastating to this cause.
Interestingly, Nixon in other areas also defied the idea that Republicans—like right-wingers and nationalists in many places—are somehow more inclined to war. His historic visit to China in 1972 marked a significant shift in the Cold War dynamic. The Republicans Ronald Reagan and George Bush the elder won not just the Cold War but the peace, believing in U.S.-led planetary progress. Not to be outdone, the younger Bush pledged that “we will encourage reform in other governments by making clear that success in our relations will require the decent treatment of their own people.
Of course, American actions have not always aligned with the fancy ideals. Influence was pursued in the name of containing communism all over the world during the Cold War, with the United States often engaging in coups and other morally dubious interventions that left a legacy of repression, instability, and resentment. But America always thought it was leading the world largely for good ends.
Obama probably put it best, in his 2009 Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech: “Whatever mistakes we have made, the plain fact is this: The United States of America has helped underwrite global security for more than six decades … not because we seek to impose our will (but) out of enlightened self-interest, because we seek a better future for our children and grandchildren, and we believe that their lives will be better if others’ children and grandchildren can live in freedom and prosperity.”
All of this—70 years of this American approach—came to a crashing thud with the election of Donald Trump in 2016. Trump’s “America First” foreign policy marked a stark departure from decades of bipartisan support for international engagement.
In his 2019 speech to the United Nations, Trump advised other world leaders that they are basically on their own: “If you want democracy, hold on to your sovereignty. And if you want peace, love your nation. Wise leaders always put the good of their own people and their own country first. The future does not belong to globalists. The future belongs to patriots,” he said. “In everything we do, we are focused on empowering the dreams and aspirations of our citizens.”
As for NATO, he declared it “obsolete,” “fat,” and “sloppy.”
With the results of Tuesday’s election, all this is back. And the irony is that even though Trump is indifferent to the world, his unsubtle ways mean that foreign policy issues—such as the war in Ukraine, escalating tensions in the Middle East, and the rise of China—are now actually important.
The consequences of this shift will be evident particularly in the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, which has become a frontline in the struggle between liberal democracies and authoritarian regimes. The decisions made in Washington in the coming months will critically influence Ukraine’s fate, affecting not only its defense against Russian aggression but also the broader international response to autocratic behaviors.
At an international conference on Ukraine, which I am attending in Bucharest, there is enormous concern about the possibility that Trump will threaten to pull military assistance and basically force Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky to acquiesce to the loss to Russia of swaths of the east of his country. There are concerns that Trump will pull troops now stationed in Romania and Poland, and that all this will embolden further Putinesque aggression. European nations may have to consider defending themselves.
And in the Middle East, there is some hope in Israel and among moderate Sunni Arab countries that Trump might “break heads” and dislodge the logjam that has kept a multifront war going for over a year. Also, that he might approach Iran with a very big stick, and explain that its games, with the nuclear program and with the terrorist militias all over the region, is over, or else.
If I were Taiwan, I would not be so confident that Trump would rush to defend me just because the United States is committed to democracy. Whether this—or the likely abandonment of Ukraine—will embolden Chinese President Xi Jinping’s China is a very big question.
In the longer term, however, it looks like America is moving away from its global leadership in the world; from the vision shared by all those other presidents, and also by President Joe Biden.
Biden attempted to maintain the traditional liberal consensus, advocating for strong support for Ukraine and the preservation of international alliances. His administration views U.S. leadership as essential for maintaining global stability, particularly in conflicts where authoritarianism threatens democratic governance.
But the progressive wing of the Democratic Party complicates this vision. This growing faction is often skeptical of military interventions and prefers to redirect resources toward domestic issues like health care and education. Such sentiments reflect a broader critique of U.S. interventionism, leading to a tension within the party regarding America’s role on the world stage.
On the Republican side, the traditional approach is not shared at all by the dominant MAGA wing of the Republican Party, which has a stranglehold on American politics for the coming years.
So, the world will have to adjust to the possibility that U.S. global leadership, at least in the form that we have known, may be coming to an end.
Dan Perry is the former Cairo-based Middle East editor and London-based Europe/Africa editor of the Associated Press, the former Chairman of the Foreign Press Association in Jerusalem and the author of two books. Follow him at danperry.substack.com.
The views expressed in this article are the writer’s own.